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FOREWORD
In January 1996, the U.S. War College's Strategic Studies
Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies
hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000."
In his presentation to the conference, Dr. Raju Thomas
examined India's defense perspectives and prospects. From the
standpoint of national security, India's post-independence
history divides neatly into a turbulent first half, which
included conflicts with China and Pakistan, and a relatively more
stable period since 1971. That stability has been rattled by
significant challenges (Kashmir, Sri Lanka, etc.), as Dr. Thomas
points out. Five years ago, the collapse of the Soviet Union
seemed to presage a more troubled era. Certainly, it caused as
broad a reassessment of strategic policy in South Asia as
elsewhere in the world.
Dr. Thomas analyzes India's security environment and the
three levels of challenges that India confronts in this post-Cold
War period--internal, conventional military, and nuclear. While
the challenges in each arena are profound and interrelated, he
finds considerable room for optimism that the early years of the
next century will see continued stability in South Asia.
While the risks may be low, the consequences of conflict
among states in the region with existing or near nuclear
capabilities would be serious indeed. Also, the longer term
offers the requirements for accommodating the rise of Chinese
power, watching the uncertain political evolution in Pakistan
and deciding India's own choices about expanding its role in the
region and the world.
Dr. Thomas' survey of Indian security provides valuable
insights to issues which will become increasingly germane to U.S.
strategic interests.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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INDIA'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:
TOWARDS THE YEAR 2000
Introduction.
The end of the Cold War, marked by the collapse of the
Soviet Union, transformed the global security environment. This
sudden change generated a catharsis in India's security
perspectives and policies. During much of the Cold War, the
Soviet Union was a pivotal actor that influenced India's
formulation and conduct of its security policies.1
India had established security and military ties with the
Soviet Union in the mid-1960s following wars with China in 1962
and Pakistan in 1965. The growing collaboration was highlighted
in September 1971 by the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and
Friendship which was signed at the height of the East Pakistan
secessionist movement.2 With Sino-American "rapprochement" also
in progress at the same time, the treaty with the Soviet Union
enabled India to resolve the "Bangladesh" issue by force in
December 1971. India waged war with Pakistan without much fear of
military intervention by Pakistan's then allies, China and the
United States. However, even before 1991, India's security
problems were not directly related to Cold War politics. The
primary sources of Indian security fears were regional, not
global, although these fears were compounded by great power
intrusions into the region emanating from the politics of the
Cold War. Rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union,
and China and the Soviet Union, enabled Pakistan to obtain
American and Chinese military assistance to counter Indian
military capabilities. Meanwhile, India had turned increasingly
to the Soviet Union for weapons to counter or preempt Pakistani
arms procurement.
During this period there were constant pressures on the part
of both India and Pakistan to become nuclear weapons states. Two
underlying characteristics may be noted about the covert or
latent nuclear arms race in South Asia, one perpetual and the
other a relatively new situation. First, Pakistan's propulsion
towards nuclear weapons arose mainly from strategic imperatives,
namely, the threat from India. The nuclear energy rationalization
put forward by Pakistan later was an afterthought. The Pakistani
program may be viewed, therefore, as a "Security-to-Energy"
driven phenomenon. India, on the other hand, perceived nuclear
energy programs as critical for meeting anticipated shortfalls in
the country's overall energy needs. Thereafter, various security
rationalizations for nuclear weapons, such as the Chinese nuclear
threat, tended to be spinoffs from the technological capability
generated by the energy program. The Indian program, therefore,
may be seen as an "Energy-to-Security" driven phenomenon. This
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analytical distinction is important when attempting to prevent
proliferation in South Asia. In the case of Pakistan, it is more
critical to address its security concerns, real or imagined. In
the case of India, it may be more meaningful to watch its nuclear
energy and space programs. These may be for genuine civilian
development purposes, but they could be diverted to the making of
nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.
The second characteristic of the South Asian nuclear
situation was the change in the direction of India's primary
nuclear threat perceptions. As before, India still insists on
maintaining its "nuclear option," i.e., it will neither acquire
the bomb nor sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) for
the present. But, India also proclaims the right to acquire
nuclear weapons in the future if its security warranted such a
move. However, the same "option" policy now exists in a radically
different setting. Before the 1974 Indian atomic test, India's
nuclear option policy was directed solely at China's perceived
nuclear threat, but conditioned by Pakistan's expected reaction.
But, as Pakistan proceeded headlong towards acquiring the bomb
after the 1974 Indian test, there followed a decade of ambiguity
and uncertainty in India about the direction from which it faced
a nuclear threat. Was it China or was it Pakistan? By the early
to mid 1980s, Indian analysts were convinced that Pakistan had
put together an effective nuclear weapons program. Thereafter,
India's nuclear option policy was directed primarily at the
Pakistani nuclear threat.
This change in the orientation and direction of India's
perceived nuclear threats continues into the 1990s. It also marks
a significant change in India's ability to control the nuclear
situation in South Asia. At one time, India had the "luxury," as
it were, of deciding whether or not South Asia would become
nuclearized. Now Pakistan determines whether South Asia will
become nuclearized--while India can only respond.
Meanwhile, India's internal security problems, to include
violent secessionist movements and communal (mainly Hindu-Muslim)
rioting, have become perennial since independence. Only the
extent and intensity of these problems have varied. Until the
early 1980s, the separatist movements were largely confined to
the tribes of the northeast: Nagas, Mizos, Gharos, Khasis and
others. Following long bouts of insurgency and counterinsurgency, carving out three mini-states from the state of Assam
(Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya) mainly resolved these
pressures. Violent separatist movements in the major states of
Punjab, Assam and Kashmir commenced only after 1984. Hindu-Muslim
rioting remained sporadic, occurring mainly in Uttar Pradesh,
Bihar, Gujerat, and Maharashtra.
By rank order, Indian policymakers during the period 1960-90
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judged threats in Southern Asia from China and Pakistan to be of
paramount concern, followed by the policies of the United States
and the Soviet Union. The "nuclear option" continued to be an
important part of the security debate among policymakers,
analysts, and the attentive Indian public. While separatist
movements in the northeast and Hindu-Muslim tensions were of
concern, by Indian standards, at least, political life went on
"as usual."
The Shifting Dymanics of India's Security Environment.
Whether gradual or sudden, substantial alterations have
taken place in the India's security environment. The strategic
relationships among India, Pakistan, and China at the regional
level, and China, Russia (formerly USSR), and the United States
at the global level, continue to define the security framework of
India, although the nature of these relationships has shifted,
and the intensity has declined.3 Certain specific post-Cold War
global political, economic, and social trends--democratization,
marketization, increasing concerns about human rights violations,
regional integration--further define the evolving Indian
strategic environment. These constant or changing regional and
global interstate relationships directly or indirectly affect the
three basic levels of India's security concerns: internal
security, conventional military security, and nuclear security.
Each of these three basic levels demands new priorities in
policymaking. Considerable interaction takes place among them.
Internal security problems at the first level include
domestic violence and proxy wars conducted by India's neighbors
across national boundaries in support of Indian secessionist
movements. India alleges that Kashmiri and Sikh insurgents
operate out of Pakistan with Pakistani support. Before the Indian
Peacekeeping Forces went into Sri Lanka, many Tamil insurgents in
Sri Lanka allegedly operated from India.4 Before the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971, both China and Pakistan supported the Naga
and Mizo separatist movements in Northeast India. Secessionist
violence continues to rise and fall in Sindh in Pakistan, and
Assam in India. India could fuel the neighboring Sindhi
separatist movement, and Bangladesh could do the same with the
Assamese and Mizo separatist movements. Burma could support
separatist violence in Nagaland and Mizoram if it chose to do so.
During the height of these tribal insurgencies in the 1960s and
1970s, Naga and Mizo guerillas moved freely across the
uncontrolled Indo-Burmese frontiers and received small arms from
across the Burmese-Chinese border. Insurgency in Tibet in the
1950s led to war between India and China in 1962. Despite
improved relations between India and China today, repression or
instability in Tibet generates domestic debate in India regarding
its relations with China. India is directly or indirectly
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involved or concerned about all such "internal" security issues
both within its own borders and those of its neighbors.
Security pressures at the second level concern the
continuing conventional arms race and the prospects for a
conventional war between India and Pakistan. The conventional
arms race needs to be examined in the context of internal
security problems and nuclear weapons capabilities in the region.
How effective are conventional forces in dealing with
insurgencies and terrorist strategies? Would nuclear weapons
capabilities in South Asia make conventional forces and military
strategies less relevant? Would this capability prevent
conventional wars between India and Pakistan for fear of
escalation to nuclear war, not unlike the situation among the
nuclear superpowers? Again, would such military paralysis at the
conventional and nuclear levels increase wars of proxy through
clandestine arms supplies to insurgents across national
boundaries?
The interaction of domestic and unconventional security
problems (insurgency, terrorism, and large-scale civilian
violence) with conventional external security problems
(traditional inter-state wars) complicates and muddles the role
of the armed forces. Should the regular armed forces be used to
address both problems of security since they impinge upon each
other? The Indian armed forces have resisted this idea, claiming
that they are not trained to deal with internal security and that
such a role would also undermine their effectiveness in dealing
with external security threats.
Security concerns at the third level may be found in the
potential nuclearization of South Asia and its likely impact on
regional and global stability. Is South Asia already nuclearized?
Should we attempt to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in South
Asia, or a nuclear weapons-safe zone? Is it possible for India
and Pakistan to develop and deploy nuclear weapons without test
detonations? Would a "nuclearized" South Asia be stable or
unstable? Needless to say, nuclear developments in South Asia
affect proliferation elsewhere, and conversely, proliferation
elsewhere (in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Northeast Asia)
affects nuclear strategies in South Asia.
All three security levels are interrelated, perhaps as a
possible scenario of conflict escalation. Conflict may begin with
secessionist violence within a state, which may then spill across
international frontiers by a proxy war, sparking a regional
conventional war. This may further escalate into a regional
nuclear war, then a strategic nuclear conflict as allies are
drawn in. This scenario of three-stage escalation applies to
Indo-Pakistani confrontations only. However, the first stage of
war in South Asia--namely, spillover wars through proxies--could
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apply to all the major countries of South Asia.
The three levels of security and conflict reflect the
origin, sequence, and probability of occurrence. Thus,
secessionist or separatist violence, as in the case of Indian
Kashmir and Punjab, in Pakistan's Sindh province, and in Sri
Lanka's Tamil areas, is most frequent and perpetual. From such
internal insurgencies, conventional inter-state war may occur,
especially between India and Pakistan. This could escalate to
nuclear levels since both India and Pakistan possess the ability
to convert their nuclear resources and technology to weapons
capabilities at short notice. Indeed, they may already possess
covert nuclear weapons stockpiles. Contrary to some speculation,
there is little evidence that a covert or mutant "Cuban Missile
Crisis"-type situation occurred between India and Pakistan during
the intensity of the 1993 Kashmir crisis.5 Indeed, this
scenario's worst-case last stage of escalation--nuclear war--is
mentioned here to prompt methods to prevent it from happening.
Security pressures and violent conflict, or the prospect for
such conflict, at each of the three levels are modified or
magnified by several emerging conditions and trends, to include
greater privatization and democratization; the decline of the
non-aligned movement; improvements in Sino-Indian relations;
shifting patterns in security relationships; and the general
erosion of state sovereignty.

Greater privatization and democratization. The trends
towards greater privatization (e.g., a market economy) and
democratization in South Asia may alleviate these security
problems. All the countries of South Asia are now democratic
except Bhutan, which represents less than one percent of the
population of South Asia. If the recent observation made by Bruce
Russett and other political scientists carries merit, namely that
democracies have not gone to war against each other over the last
50 years, then it could be argued that the avoidance of war
between India and Pakistan throughout the Kashmir crisis was due
to prevailing democracies in both countries.6
The growth of market economies and democracy may minimize or
soften security problems among neighboring countries which
possess the same economic and political values. This growth may
lead to greater regional economic integration, a trend that may
imitate and parallel the one-time warring member states of the
European Union and of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or
ASEAN7 (which now includes Vietnam against whom ASEAN was once
directed). But this potential in South Asia remains doubtful. The
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not
been doing so well.8 Even cricket matches between India and
Pakistan, which were expected to serve as confidence-building
measures, usually turn out to be a sort of non-shooting war by
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proxy.9 Kashmiri Muslims, and indeed probably many Indian Muslims
elsewhere, usually cheer Pakistani cricket teams against India.
This is not a laughing matter because many Hindu nationalists
point to this phenomenon as proof that most Indian Muslims are
really "Pakistanis" at heart.

Decline of the Nonalignment Movement. Nonalignment, the onetime fulcrum of India's foreign and security policy, has become
irrelevant, whether it still exists in some other reincarnation
or not.10 With no competing global power blocs, it may be
important for India to take into account that the West is
militarily and economically dominant. Russia can be of no
assistance (as in the past) in countering any pro-Pakistani
stance that the United States may take up. At present both India
and Pakistan are wooing the United States and the West as
possible quasi-allies. Indeed, at the end of the Cold War there
was a sudden Indian rush towards embracing the United States. New
Delhi sought greater military cooperation with the United States,
but soon ran into several roadblocks. India's refusal to protect
American pharmaceutical patents, its decision to buy from Russia
cryogenic engines for its rocket program, and the testing of the
Prithvi missile in defiance of American warnings, have cooled
U.S. interest to establish closer military ties, and provoked
growing suspicions in India about American friendship.11 However,
it is important to note that while Indo-American military ties
have not progressed as well as India would desire, economic ties
have been booming as never before. The United States was always
India's main trading partner, but now leading American
corporations have rushed into India with investment capital
following New Delhi's economic liberalization.12
Correspondingly, while it has become clear that Russia has
few economic benefits to offer India, the sudden break in IndoSoviet military collaboration following the end of the Cold War
is now being mended. Much of this change stems from India's
desire to purchase or manufacture under license Russian weapons,
especially the MiG-29 and the Sukhoi-30 combat aircraft.13 Indeed,
proponents in both India and Russia push the creation of a new
triangular defence relationship between India, Russia, and
China.14

Improvement in Sino-Indian Relations. Sino-Indian relations
have recently shown considerable improvement, possibly to
Pakistan's security detriment.15 A de facto solution to the SinoIndian border dispute has taken effect.16 Relations at the
official level have displayed increasing cooperation, although
various Indian analysts have pointed out the potential for future
disputes and military rivalry.17 A basic and underlying rivalry
still remains, especially since the Chinese conventional and
nuclear arms buildup continues unabated. India's development of
the Agni Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the
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conversion of Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles to match the
capability of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) appear
"targeted" against China, not Pakistan. A growing Sino-Indian
naval rivalry is possible in the future. The Chinese Navy has
been active around the Spratly and Paracell Islands, and there
have been reports that China is aiding Burma to build a naval
base at Rangoon. Since India's maritime territorial jurisdiction
extends from the Lakshwadeep Islands in the Arabian Sea, to the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, stretching up
to the Straits of Malacca, the possibility increases of SinoIndian naval confrontation.

Shifting Patterns in Security Relationships. India and
Pakistan are looking now in different directions to define the
central aspects of their foreign and security policies.18 Pakistan
is looking west towards the Islamic world (Central Asia, Iran,
and Turkey) to foster closer political, economic, and perhaps
military ties. Pakistan has been at the forefront of promoting
the enlarged Economic Cooperative Organization (ECO), a kind of
successor to the Pakistan-Iran-Turkey Regional Cooperation for
Development (RCD) which emerged from the old Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) defense pact.19 The ECO consists of these
three states, joined by all six of the Muslim republics of the
former Soviet Union,20 plus Afghanistan. But the ECO is not
working all that well.21 Afghanistan as a functioning country
barely exists anymore. An on-and-off civil war continues in
Tajikistan. Iran and Turkey are pursuing their own political
agendas in the Central Asian republics. At the same time, India
is looking eastward towards Southeast Asia and East Asia for
economic ties, and inwards to deal with its numerous internal
security problems.
General Erosion of State Sovereignty. Finally, state
sovereignty is generally eroding, especially where human rights
violations are taking place. This erosion affects India,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka's handling of its internal security
problems, especially in the Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Sindh, and
Tamil regions. Serious human rights violations now often result
in international intervention, as in the cases of Cambodia, Iraq,
Bosnia, and Rwanda. Undoubtedly, it is much more difficult to
threaten to intervene in the case of states as big and powerful
as China (in Tibet), Russia (in Chechnya), or India (in Kashmir),
but they could face international economic sanctions.
Internal Security Issues.
The most serious threats to the states of South Asia are
internal conflict and the potential for state disintegration.22
Two successful secessionist movements have already taken place on
the subcontinent: the creation of Pakistan out of British India
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in 1947 and the creation of Bangladesh out of Pakistan in 1971.
The creation of these two states was preceded by bloody communal
conflict, followed by Indo-Pakistani wars. Similarly, within
Europe the breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the
early 1990s were extremely violent, as was, after a bloody 10year African war, Eritrea's 1993 break from Ethiopia.
The basic dilemma underlying secessionist conflict is
whether to recognize the right to national self-determination of
various ethnic groups who feel that their future is best served
by carving out their own independent states or to support the
right of the state to maintain its sovereignty and territorial
integrity as it sees fit because it is sovereign and independent.
Except for the creations of Pakistan and Bangladesh, all
nationalist-secessionist movements in South Asia have been
crushed or simply dissipated through a combination of military
pressure and political negotiations. The Baluchi and Pashtun
separatist movements have melted away, while the Sindh separatist
movement may also hopefully go the same way. In India, the
Dravidastan separatist movement among the Tamils simply
dissipated after the DMK gained power in Tamil Nadu in the mid
1960s. The Naga, Mizo, and Khasi/Gharo secessionist movements
were resolved through a combination of military force and
political concessions, mainly by allowing new mini-states to be
formed within the Indian Union. A combination of military force
and political concessions short of conceding independence
resolved the Sikh and Assamese separatist movements. Thus, the
three main problem areas remaining are Kashmir (in India), the
Tamil Ealam movement (in Sri Lanka), and the Sindhi-Mohajir
question (in Pakistan).
The Kashmir situation somewhat differs from the other
separatist movements because it involves a dispute between India
and Pakistan that dates back to partition in 1947, when the
Muslim province remained a part of India. For Pakistan, the
Kashmir question is the unfinished business of partition. As far
as India is concerned, the Kashmir problem is an internal
problem; it considers the accession by the Maharaja of Kashmir
legal and final.23 After the separation of East Pakistan in 1971,
the Kashmir issue seemed finally settled. Pakistan no longer
appeared to represent the Muslims of the subcontinent, especially
given the Mohajir situation in Sindh and Islamabad's internal war
with Sindhi Muslims. Pakistan rarely made serious claims to
Kashmir after 1971 until the revolt erupted in Indian Kashmir
following the rigged elections of 1987.
Unlike past crises over Kashmir that provoked conventional
wars between India and Pakistan, this crisis involves terrorism,
insurgency, a proxy war, and a fundamental and qualitative shift
in the nature of the crisis itself. Past differences between
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India and Pakistan concerned the acceptance and validity of the
"two-nation theory" of Hindu and Muslim nations in an undivided
India. The current Kashmir crisis is far more "international" and
"Islamic" in character. Various Kashmiri insurgent groups have
accepted the Islamic fundamentalist beliefs of Iran, adopted the
insurgency tactics of the mujaheddin struggle in Afghanistan
during the Soviet occupation, and assumed the style and approach
of the Palestinian Intifada.
Under the present conditions of Muslim alienation from India
in Kashmir, if a two-way plebiscite (a choice between India or
Pakistan) were to be held in Kashmir today, in all likelihood
India would lose the plebiscite, and the majority of Muslim
Kashmiris would vote to join Pakistan. However, if a third
option, of independence, were offered, the majority of Kashmiris
would probably choose independence. Ultimately, India's power
will prevail, affirming its international legal right to rule in
Kashmir whether or not it earns the political legitimacy bestowed
by the consent of the governed.
Nevertheless, it would appear more advisable to maintain the
territorial status quo in South Asia whatever India's legal and
moral rights in Kashmir. There are more Muslims in India than in
Pakistan or Bangladesh, and sending Kashmir to Pakistan could set
Indian Muslims back to the bloody strife of 1947. Some extreme
Hindu nationalists have declared that if Kashmir is ceded to
Pakistan, Pakistan should be prepared to save the remaining 120
million Indian Muslims as well. Perhaps there may be a growing
feeling among moderate Hindus that hanging on to Kashmir has
become counterproductive, not unlike the feeling of some in Great
Britain about hanging on to Northern Ireland. Let Kashmir go to
Pakistan and let Northern Ireland go to Ireland as they probably
should have when Pakistan was created in 1947 and Ireland in
1921. But, the difference is the probable consequences for 120
million Indian Muslims if Kashmir is transferred to Pakistan.
Besides, whether Northern Ireland is part of Great Britain or
Ireland may make little difference now, since Great Britain and
Ireland are now both members of the European Union which
maintains open borders among the member states. South Asia has
not yet reached that stage.
As regards Tamil demands for an independent Tamil Ealam
carved out of Sri Lanka, and Sindhi demands for a free Sindhudesh
independent of Pakistan, it appears doubtful if either of these
demands will be conceded. Prospects for Tamil Ealam are now even
more distant, with India supporting Sri Lanka to maintain its
territorial integrity against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Ealam (LTTE). India has thrown a naval cordon around Sri Lanka to
prevent the smuggling of arms to the Tamil Tigers. Much of the
official Indian anger towards the Tamil Tigers began with the
bloody involvement of the Indian Peace-Keeping Forces (IPKF) with
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the Tamil insurgents whom the IPKF had gone to protect. India's
withdrawal of support for the Tamil cause (although this was
always short of Tamil independence) followed the assassination of
then Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, by a Tamil Tiger
suicide killer. Indeed, this event alienated much of ethnic Tamil
support within India's Tamil Nadu for the Tamil Ealam movement in
Sri Lanka.
Within Pakistan's Sindh province, Mohajir demands for their
own state within Pakistan pits them against the Sindhis, the sons
of the soil, who believe they have already been dispossessed by
the Indian emigre Muslim population. Sindhis want an independent
Sindhudesh. Mohajirs talk about creating their own province
within Pakistan out of its Sindh province linking the main cities
of Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur through corridors, or just
creating a state south of the 26th parallel. This would leave an
impoverished and rump Sindh province with virtually no resources.
India's position on this issue has remained ambiguous, wavering
between sympathy for both the Sindhi separatists and the Indian
Muslim emigres. The Sindh separatist movement and the opposing
Mohajir's violent struggle against the Sindhis undermines
Pakistan's moral claims to Kashmir. Although India appears to be
less involved, if at all, in the violent struggle taking place in
Pakistan's Sindh province, instability in Sindh counterbalances
instability in Kashmir. Pakistan's ability to undermine India by
playing the "Kashmir" card, can be countered by India's ability
to undermine Pakistan by playing the "Sindh" card.
Meanwhile, through Indian application of armed force and
political concessions, the Assamese and Sikh separatist movements
were fizzling out in the early 1990s, although there is some
revival of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) which
spearheaded the Assamese independence movement.24 There is a
similar revival of the Naga independence movement. There are
other demands in India for new mini-states within India such as
Gurkhaland and Bodoland in the northeast, and the carving out of
a large new state for the Adivasis out of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh
and Orissa to be called Jharkand.
The fact is, with the exception of Bangladesh which has a
minor tribal separatist movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts,
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are all vulnerable. The threat to
the territorial integrity of these states comes mainly from
within. Successful internal security management will determine
the survival of these states in their present form.
Conventional Forces and External Security.
In the past, the conventional arms race and the balance of
conventional forces in South Asia were usually considered crucial
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in understanding the probabilities of war occurrence and war
outcome in South Asia. The conventional military balance now
appears relatively less deterministic about such probabilities
compared to the earlier decades. Any war between India and
Pakistan in the future must take into account each side's ability
to conduct wars of proxy concurrently, and the threat to escalate
the war to nuclear levels. They constitute complicating or
supplementary factors in devising strategies of conventional
wars in South Asia.
In South Asia, land forces remain crucial to the conduct of
wars, and while some global technological advances will have been
absorbed by the armed forces, technological levels do not equal
those found in the United States and the West. Efforts by South
Asian countries to upgrade their weapons systems with advancing
military technology (such as precision guided missiles) for all
the Services will not radically change their military strategy;
doctrine continues to give the primary combat role to ground
forces, with air and naval forces providing mainly supporting
roles.
Following the 1962 Sino-Indian War, India's defense against
China has rested on the 10 to 11 lightly-armed mountain/infantry
divisions raised in the 1960s, which supposedly act as a "tripwire." But, there is really no fall-back conventional defense
measure short of demonstrating an Indian nuclear deterrent based
on IRBMs tipped with nuclear warheads. This is precisely what the
Indian Agni missile and covert nuclear weapons programs are
intended to serve.
Against Pakistan, India's battle scenarios do not look
fundamentally different from the those fought in 1965 and 1971.
In the 1965 war, the armies and air forces of India and Pakistan
fought independent and separate battles with limited close air
support. For the greater part, the Indian Air Force and the
Pakistan Air Force conducted their own separate interdiction
campaigns, targeting ammunition dumps and air bases. The navies
of the two countries were not involved. During the 1971 war, all
three services were engaged, but there was not much
synchronization except for the Indian naval attack on Karachi
harbor, which was coordinated with an Indian air attack on the
city to draw away the Pakistan Air Force. For the rest, the air
forces and navies on either side conducted their own wars with
limited ground support provided in certain battles.
Military legacies and traditions change slowly in South
Asia. Not even the major shock of 1971 losses provoked a change
to Pakistani military strategy which continues to emphasize land
forces. There is an effort to obtain advanced aircraft from the
West (including unsuccessful efforts to obtain F-16s from the
United States), and there has been a modest build up of the

11

Pakistan Navy with the acquisition of short-range Augusto and
Daphne- class submarines and a few frigates. The Pakistan Army
remains the backbone of the Pakistani military. India has
adjusted better, with the army now drawing only 60 percent of the
defense budget (down from a high of almost 80 percent in the
1950s). India paid greater attention to its air force and navy.
But even here the lessons of the Gulf War and Bosnia highlighting
high-tech, precision-guided weapons have not been incorporated in
Indian strategic thinking, force structure, and equipment.25 The
failure to copy Western military strategy based on the supremacy
of high-tech air power may result from India's inability to
procure or pay for such technology. Also, direct Western
military intervention in another war in South Asia, which would
upset the regional military balance, is not expected.
Recall that India conducted a proxy war in East Pakistan
throughout 1971 before a two-front conventional war broke out
between India and East and West Pakistan.26 The insurgency in East
Pakistan speeded up the Indian military victory in the east. In
the west there was a stalemate. The conduct of another IndiaPakistan war must take into account Pakistan's ability to
simultaneously feed the Kashmiri insurgents, and India's
potential to fuel unrest in Sindh. In that respect, Kashmir is
India's "Bangladesh."27 In a similar vein, Sindhi nationalists in
Hyderabad and London told me that they had made a mistake when
they failed to seize the opportunity to carve out a "Sindhudesh"
in 1971 with the help of the Indian armed forces while they were
"liberating" Bangladesh.28 Thus, if India loses Kashmir in another
Indo-Pakistani war (although quite unlikely), Pakistan could also
lose Sindh. The loss of Kashmir or the loss of Sindh could
completely unravel both India and Pakistan into several
independent states, as happened in the former Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia. A future Indo-Pakistani war could be messy, with
aspects of the Vietnam/Afghanistan syndrome coming into play.
Along the Himalayan frontiers, in the less likely event of
another conventional Sino-Indian war, India could stir up
insurgents in Tibet, while China could do the same in Kashmir,
Assam, and the other mini-states of Northeast India. India still
deploys its ten mountain divisions ready to fight the last war of
1962 again. Sino-Indian tensions would only occur in the event of
another Tibetan uprising which seems unlikely at present. This is
in part because--through migrations and settlements--Han Chinese
have become the majority in Greater Tibet. Hindu Nationalists
advocate a similar resettlement policy and solution for Kashmir
as well. Indeed, three million Kashmiri Muslims could easily have
been overwhelmed decades ago through Hindu and Sikh settlements
in Kashmir. This India has not done.
Despite the renewed, but mellowed, wave of "Hindi-Chini
Bhai-Bhai" (Indians and Chinese are Brothers), voices within
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India are cautious regarding the growth of Chinese military
capabilities.29 China's aggressive policies toward Hong Kong, the
Paracell and Spratly Islands, and Taiwan, have produced periodic
criticism in the Indian parliament and press regarding the
current Congress government's rush towards embracing China
without serious qualifications.30 In early 1996, former chiefs of
the Indian armed forces urged the Congress government to bolster
its military capability and focus on China's long-term plans in
South Asia. According to the assessment of Lieutenant General
K.K. Hazari, "Pakistan is not a military threat, but we have to
work out a long-term perspective on capability vis-a-vis China,
say after 15 or 20 years."31 According to retired Vice Admiral
R.B. Suri, "China is making inroads into the Indian Ocean by
building up a navy that in the next 10-15 years could interfere
with our interests in the region."32 However, Indian concerns
about the growth of Chinese conventional and nuclear military
power and its aggressive territorial claims to the Spratly
Islands and Taiwan are countered by those who argue that Indian
political--if not military--cooperation with China and Russia is
essential to counter the military, economic, and political
dominance of a U.S.-led West.33 Indeed, it may not be too farfetched to say that while the Defense Ministry is warning about
Chinese threats, the External Affairs Ministry is seeking to
promote Sino-Indian and Indo-Russian cooperation.
Chinese military modernization has targeted air and naval
forces. In early 1996, China contracted with Russia to purchase
72 Su-27 multi-role fighters to replace some of its aging 4,000
indigenously built aircraft based on 1950s Soviet technology.34
The Chinese have claimed that these purchases were to counter
Taiwanese purchases of American F-16s and French Mirage-2000s.
The size of China's land and air forces is numerically
overwhelming, although the qualitative standards of some of its
equipment may be inferior to that of India. As in the growth of
the Indian Navy in 1980s, it is the growth of the Chinese Navy in
the 1990s that may be of greater concern to the Southeast Asian
countries. The following comparison of the basic sizes of the
militaries of China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Pakistan
illustrate the wide divergence in the regional military balance:35

Land Forces
Tanks
Towed Arty
Combat Aircraft
Combat Ships
Submarines
Patrol/Combat
Boats

China

India

2.2m
8,000
14,500
4,970
50
50
870

1.0m
2,400
4,075
844
25
15
41
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Pakistan
0.5m
2,050
1,566
430
11
9
13

Vietnam
0.5m
1,300
2,300
190
7
0
57

Indonesia
0.2m
330
170
73
13
2
44

Neither India nor China have "blue water" navies;36 they can
be better described as "brown water" navies. Whereas India has
two ex-British aging aircraft carriers, China has none. On the
other hand, whereas India's naval expansion has slowed down or
even halted, the Chinese Navy has begun to expand. In 1995, China
arranged for the purchase of four submarines from Moscow at a
cost of $4 billion.37 The purchase of another six submarines is
being negotiated, with the purchase of yet another 12 by the end
of the decade. The purchase of 22 submarines in 5 years suggests
that China is moving well beyond a coastal defense role and
towards an offensive naval capability. Both India and China
sought to buy from Ukraine a former Soviet aircraft carrier, now
rusting in a Ukrainian harbor, but the quality and price proved
unacceptable. Both India and China are attempting to promote and
establish indigenous naval technologies. Although India's recent
efforts to produce its own submarines in collaboration with a
German firm has been abandoned (only two were produced), India's
indigenous Godavari-class frigate development program, an
extension of the construction of the Leander-class frigates in
Bombay in collaboration with a British firm, has been a major
success.
Any major expansion of the Indian Navy into a blue water
capability has always raised the possibility, albeit remote, of a
naval response from Indonesia, Pakistan, and Iran, the three
major Muslim countries of Asia. However remote this may now
appear, it could potentially create a virtual Islamic naval
triangle around India. In the 1960s, the Indonesian Navy under
Sukarno attempted to expand, and likewise, the Shah of Iran
sought to build up a significant Iranian naval force during the
1970s. Meanwhile, Pakistan, in response to India's naval buildup,
has acquired nine submarines (including two Augusto-class
submarines from Italy and four Daphne-class submarines from
France) and 11 combat ships (including three ex-U.S. destroyers
and six ex-U.K. frigates). Similarly, any major expansion of the
Chinese Navy may invite an Indian naval response and also trigger
naval purchases in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines.38 The
Asian security dilemma at sea may interlock naval rivalries among
the littoral states of the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the
South China Sea.
In any future Indo-Pakistani or Sino-Indian conventional
war, the nuclear factor must be taken into account, quite unlike
the past, when all wars in South Asia were strictly among
conventional powers. China tested its first bomb in 1964, two
years after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India tested its first bomb
(or peaceful nuclear device) in 1974, about two years after the
December 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. No wars between India and its
traditional antagonists have occurred since these wars in the
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decade between 1962 and 1971. The present conditions for another
conventional war are now under the shadow of nuclear capabilities
in China, India, and Pakistan. A "nuclear India" could deploy
IRBMs capable of reaching the industrial cities of south China.
India now possesses a second-strike capability against China.
Both India and Pakistan possess aircraft capable of dropping
nuclear weapons. Mutual retaliatory strike capability exists
between India and Pakistan. All of this affects conventional war
strategy in South Asia. The threatened use of nuclear weapons in
South Asia may be seen as a strategy of conventional war
deterrence, or, if war did break out, of conventional war
termination.
Since the end of the Cold War, the conventional arms race in
South Asia has slowed down considerably.39 No major new weapons
acquisitions have taken place. Pakistan is trying to obtain the
F-16 fighters whose purchase from the United States was halted by
the Pressler Amendment, or get its money back; India is trying to
obtain from Russia a few more MiG-29 fighters and some T-72
tanks. Indigenous design, development, and production of weapons
systems continue as before in India, but successes have been
limited to certain parts and sections of weapons systems.
Development of the Light Combat aircraft has floundered, while
several prototypes of the Main Battle Tank have not met the
expectations of the Indian Army and have proven very costly.
However, a variety of aircraft, tanks, frigates and submarines
have been produced in India through technology transfers from
overseas manufacturers. Although India's naval capabilities are
quite modest, its navy still appears overwhelming compared to
that of Pakistan. However, much of India's Soviet-vintage
submarine fleet (old and dangerous because of malfunctions) is
being taken out of commission. Efforts failed to obtain a third
carrier, but two old British carriers remain in service.
Conventional weapons purchases in South Asia have been relatively
quiet despite the availability of weapons from the ex-Soviet
republics at bargain basement prices. The size of the Indian Army
has actually declined from about 1.2 million uniformed personnel
at its peak in the 1970s to just under 1 million in the mid1990s.
Size alone is an inaccurate tool to evaluate ground forces.
Indian force capabilities dwarf those of Pakistan, but the force
deployment throughout the various regions, especially in the
north and east, produces local parity. India argues that raw
numbers of men and equipment, without an assessment of their
comparative technological sophistication, are insufficient to
determine military advantage. Terrain and duration also play a
role. India claims to have the disadvantage in fighting wars
against Pakistan and China in Kashmir and along the Himalayan
frontiers, respectively, and in wars that last barely a month,
quantitative superiority in weapons is less decisive than the
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effectiveness of frontline equipment that can be deployed
immediately.
India justifies this naval expansion since it was never
really tied to Pakistani naval capabilities but to India's large
coastline, its island territories, the increasing seaborne trade,
and so on. The power of the Chinese Navy and claims to the
Spratly Islands and Paracell Islands suggest a future possible
Sino-Indian naval arms race as China extends its naval reach to
the Straits of Malacca. However, as with the other two services,
Indian naval policy has been largely that of force maintenance
and sustenance rather than expansion.
Economic reforms in India and Pakistan, especially the
process of marketization and privatization, affect weapons
procurement. In India, "privatization" unleashed the private (not
public) sector and opened up the Indian market to foreign
investments. Public sector undertakings, to include defense, have
not benefitted; rather, they are just being allowed to wither
away slowly. It is unclear what the government intends to do
about public sector defense production; the government may
neglect industries such as Hindustan Aeronautics, Mazagon Docks,
Bharat Electronics, and so forth, or replace them with private
sector contracting for defense goods. Indeed, it is unknown
whether these defense public sector undertakings will be
sustained. In other words, India's privatization may not apply to
defense production, at least in the short run.
Conventional Forces and Internal Security.
The fact that future conventional wars in South Asia will
possibly involve concurrent domestic low-intensity conflicts
raises the question of the use of conventional forces to deal
with internal conflict and security. The militaries of India,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have been used to crush secessionist
movements at various times: in the northeast tribal belt, in
Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir by the Indian Army; in East Pakistan
(unsuccessfully), in Baluchistan, the Northwest Frontier Province
and Sindh by the Pakistan Army; and in the Tamil areas of the
Northern and Eastern provinces by the Sri Lankan Army.
Until the Indian Army's assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple
in Punjab in 1984, the military was viewed by much of the Indian
population as a symbol of national unity. To most Indians, the
military was, and still is, the trusted friend of the people.
Indeed, the Indian military sees itself as the defender of the
nation and as an important symbol of national unity, and it would
like to keep things that way. The military acts as an integrating
force in its national recruitment efforts; its role as the
defender of the nation against external aggression; and, its role
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in providing disaster relief and other assistance to the civilian
authorities during natural calamities. The recruitment policy and
composition of the Indian military are largely responsible for
the stability of India's democracy; the absence of such pressure
may provide clues, on the other hand, to why democracy in
Pakistan failed, even though Pakistan inherited one-third of the
British Indian military services.
Perceptions of the regular armed forces as symbols of
national unity and integrity began to decline following the 1984
assault on the Sikh's Golden Temple in Amritsar. Its prestige
fell further as a result of its reluctant role in the maintenance
of internal security. Controversy over the use of force to quell
domestic insurgencies, of course, surrounds both the paramilitary
forces and the armed forces. In the case of the paramilitary
forces, the issue is not whether they have a role to play in the
maintenance of internal security; they were, after all, raised
for that purpose. The issue is whether such special internal
security forces could be misused by the government in power.
Arguably, the greater the size of paramilitary forces, the
greater the probability that democratic processes and the freedom
of the citizens are likely to be undermined. On the other hand,
in the case of the regular armed forces, the question is whether
such forces should be used at all in the maintenance of internal
order.
The Indian military, unhappy about this role, has protested
that the use of the military to deal with internal conflicts
could lead to military demoralization, increasing politicization
of the military, and to the breakdown of civilian controlled
democracies. The use of the Indian Army to attack the Sikh's
Golden Temple nearly led to a mutiny by some Sikh soldiers of the
Indian Army, and it destroyed civilian-military confidence in
Punjab.40
The military argues that to use the armed services "against
their own people" would not only produce a breakdown in the
military-civilian trust that has been built up over several
decades, but also--if the army were deployed on domestic security
missions in the border provinces such as Punjab, Kashmir, and
Assam--would undermine its own ability to fight a conventional
war because of the alienation of the people living in those
regions.41 The military would eventually be seen as the enemy of
the people, a situation already found in Pakistan and several
other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
However, these military misgivings have not stopped the civilian
authorities from ordering the armed forces to deal with internal
security; the military is resigned to the situation given the
growing threats to the security and sovereignty of the Indian
state from within. As a former Army chief, General V.N. Sharma,
noted:
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What is the alternative? The police, despite its vast
rising strength of armed battalions under the Central
Home Ministry or under the various states, with
thousands of crores of expenditure, is unable to easily
control the violent masses when the police itself is
subservient to criminal political masters and their
fawning bureaucrats.42
India would like to avoid the type of political involvement
experienced by the Pakistani military, which has a record of
violent suppression in Baluchistan and in East Pakistan (before
it broke away to form the independent state of Bangladesh). The
military regime of Zia-ul Haq engaged in political battles
against various opposition groups in Pakistan, especially the
"Movement for the Restoration of Democracy" led by Benazir
Bhutto. After Bhutto came to power through the electoral process,
the military continued to be a threat to her government.
Eventually, she was deposed by the civilian president of
Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, but there were suspicions that the
military was behind the dismissal of her government.
The Indian armed forces are not equipped or trained to deal
with problems of internal law and order. As Lieutenant General M.
L. Thapan noted, "A fundamental principle of war is concentration
of men and materiel at the right place and at the right time."43
Internal security duties, on the other hand, "require dispersion
and the use of minimum force since our own countrymen are
involved."44 Similarly, Lieutenant General A. M. Vohra observed
that because the army does not mingle with the crowds (as the
police are required to do), the army's ability to sense and deal
with internal riots is severely limited.45
The use of the armed services for internal security may
produce a breakdown in military training and their readiness to
deal with external threats. Frequent use of the military for
internal purposes would invariably create friction and arouse the
emotions of both civilians and soldiers. Politicization and
corruption could eventually result in struggles for power,
leading to military coups and takeovers.
The Indian civilian authorities' response has been to build
up the paramilitary forces under the Home Ministry. But this has
had its own problems. The Indian paramilitary forces, especially
the Central Reserve Police Force and the Provincial Armed
Constabulary, are not very disciplined. The growth of such forces
to nearly half a million potentially threatens civilian
authorities. They often get caught up in the emotions of HinduMuslim or Hindu-Sikh conflict and take sides. The Provincial
Armed Constabulary and the Central Reserve Police Force have been
notorious in getting involved in communal conflict against

18

Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and Gujerat. Allegations of human rights
violations in Kashmir have been mainly directed at paramilitary
forces such as the Border Security Force.
India has one advantage over Pakistan and Sri Lanka in the
deployment of armed forces to deal with internal conflicts; it is
capable of introducing a "neutral" force in the old imperial
military tradition of British India. For example, the Indian
government could send Gurkhas to Kashmir, Madras regiments to
Punjab, the Maratha Light Infantry or Sikh regiments to Assam,
Dogra regiments to Nagaland or Mizoram, and so on. On the other
hand, because of Punjabi-Pashtun domination of the military in
Pakistan and the exclusive Sinhalese composition of the Sri Lanka
armed forces, the use of "neutral" forces becomes less possible
in these countries. Arguably, Punjabi-Pashtun intervention
between Sindhis and Mohajirs constitutes intervention by a
neutral force, but it may deteriorate into a three-way ethnic
conflict. It does little for Pakistan's national integration and
may only reinforce the image of Punjabi military domination.
Similarly, when the Sri Lankan army is sent to crush Tamil
separatism, it aggravates the Sinhalese-Tamil divide.
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Capabilities.
The recent NPT renewal conference in April 1995 went better
than expected.46 Virtually everybody signed except India,
Pakistan, and Israel. Israel says it will sign when all the
problems revolving around the Israeli-PLO Peace Accords are
settled. That would leave only India and Pakistan as the
significant "hold-out" states. Shortly after the Cold War, Thomas
Graham of the Rockefeller Foundation declared that the United
States must not think just about "coping" with proliferation, but
with "winning" the struggle against proliferation.47 The renewal
of the NPT in 1995 would indicate trends in that direction. With
the 1974 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1993
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) also in effect, it would appear
that the world is now becoming safer from dangerous
unconventional weapons. However, whereas the BWC and CWC are
non-discriminatory universal treaties,48 the problem with the NPT
is that it remains a discriminatory non-universal treaty. So long
as China has nuclear weapons, India is reluctant to sign the NPT;
if India does not sign, Pakistan will not sign as well.
Fortunately, the chain appears to end here.
There are still two other general problems. First, nuclear
proliferation in the future, especially among NPT signatories, is
likely to be either latent or covert where nuclear weapons
technology (short of putting the bomb together) will be
maintained. Little difference exists between India's peaceful
nuclear energy program and that of Japan. Indeed, Japan

19

stockpiles or has access to greater levels of plutonium and
enriched uranium than India. The American determination of who is
a potential proliferator or not is based on motivations rather
than technological capabilities. Thus, for instance, Pakistan is
considered a more likely proliferator than India, and India a
more likely proliferator than Japan.
Secondly, verification will remain difficult. Iraqi and
North Korean nuclear weapons development were discovered quite
late.49 Because India, Pakistan, and Israel (with suspected
development programs) have not signed the renewed NPT, attention
is constantly focused on them; therefore, they are more readily
monitored and illicit activity detected. Verification is even
more difficult when attempting to detect clandestine production
of chemical weapons. The CWC is a very large document of over 200
pages, much of it dealing with verification; the NPT is only
about two or three pages long--with little said about
verification and compliance enforcement. So long as there is no
technological "fix" to trace the shift from a peaceful nuclear
energy program to a nuclear weapons program, reliable
verification will prove elusive.
India and Pakistan are probably de facto nuclear weapons
states if conversion to nuclear capability at short notice is
considered the criterion. Some Indian and Pakistani strategists
have argued that since India, Pakistan, and Israel are virtually
nuclear weapons powers anyway, the nuclear club should be opened
to them--then closed again with eight members. Iran, Egypt, North
Korea, South Korea, or even Japan, are not likely to accept this
arrangement. Many states would invoke Article 10 and withdraw
from the NPT if the nuclear club was going to be opened to new
membership.
Does an increase in the number of nuclear states actually
increase the likelihood of nuclear war? The standard
interpretation argues that nuclear proliferation is dangerous and
could lead to nuclear war.50 The more the number of nuclear
weapons states, the greater the chances of nuclear war.
Opponents contend that a few more nuclear powers such as
India, Pakistan, Israel, and Japan may actually generate greater
nuclear stability through conditions of regional and multiple
nuclear deterrence.51 Non-proliferation prevents nuclear war
among potential new nuclear weapons states through denial.
Deployment of nuclear weapons and the threat of counter-attack
would deter war among new nuclear weapons states. For example,
nuclear deterrence may have prevented a conventional war between
India and Pakistan during the 1991 Kashmir crisis because both
either possessed clandestine nuclear weapons or were on the brink
of such capability.
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The argument that nuclear weapons in South Asia (implying a
legal increase in the number of members) could actually support
stability has been put forward in India by K. Subrahmanyam and
General K. Sundarji.52 Indian and Pakistani strategists have
argued that instead of attempting to create a Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone in South Asia, the international community should focus
on establishing a Nuclear Weapons Safe Zone in South Asia.
There is some limited merit to the nuclear deterrence
argument, provided nuclear weapons do not spread beyond the eight
powers. If it is possible to have a stable nuclear relationship
among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during the
Cold War, then why not a stable relationship among China, India,
and Pakistan?
On the other hand, there are four composite and standard
arguments supporting the thesis that proliferation in South Asia
would be dangerous: Emotional Intensity, Geographical Proximity,
Sudden Change, and Frequent Wars.53 Each argument has its own
strengths and weaknesses.
The "Emotional Intensity" argument suggests that religiousbased antagonism between India and Pakistan is more dangerous
than more secular-based antagonism among the five nuclear powers.
Rationality under stress would be difficult for either power to
maintain. However, this is not borne out in reality. Indian and
Pakistani decisionmakers have always been quite rational when on
the brink of war or during the conduct of war. Indeed, IndoPakistani wars have been essentially gentlemanly wars. As former
Army Chief, General K. Sundarji noted: "India and China are Not
Crazy States. They share a civilization going back 5,000 years.
During the three wars fought against each other, they have
displayed enormous restraint in targeting civilian industry or
infrastructure."54
The "Geographical Proximity" argument suggests that weapons
of mass destruction across common frontiers in each other's
backyards could lead to greater paranoia and nuclear preemption.
After all, there would be no warning time. The counter to this
argument is that nuclear attacks on each other could produce
fall-out in the territory of the attacking country, since India
and Pakistan are contiguous states. Therefore, there exists a
mutual built-in deterrent system between India and Pakistan.
The "Sudden Change" argument suggests that nuclearization in
South Asia would occur overnight with little or no learning time.
Therefore, this could prove destabilizing. However, this is not
necessarily so, because India and Pakistan already understand the
logic of nuclear strategy as played out by the nuclear powers
during the Cold War. They understand the conditions of nuclear
stability and instability.

21

The "Frequent Wars" in South Asia argument suggests that
nuclearization of South Asia would imply greater chances of
nuclear war. However, the situation has actually proved to be the
opposite. A nuclear India or Pakistan would not even dare engage
in conventional wars for fear of escalation to nuclear levels. We
should keep in mind that the existing nuclear powers never
engaged in direct conventional wars with each other although
there were two major wars conducted against each other, by the
Soviet Union and the United States through their proxies in
Vietnam and Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan is conducting a war
against India through its Muslim proxies in Kashmir. But there
appears to be no imminent danger of a conventional war between
India and Pakistan over Kashmir, let alone a nuclear war. This
situation may exist because latent nuclear weapons capabilities
in India and Pakistan have now paralyzed military action at the
conventional and nuclear levels.
However, the avoidance of wars under the logic of nuclear
deterrence implies a restricted number of nuclear weapons states
locked especially in a two-way or three-way relationship. Nuclear
relationships that were four-way or more, or several two-way and
three-way nuclear relationships sugggest instability. Nuclear
deterrence might create nuclear stability between India and
Pakistan, but it might not be relevant if nuclear weapons were to
spread to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, the Koreas, Japan, and
Taiwan.55
There were fears in early 1996 that India, following the
examples of France and China, was about to conduct a series of
nuclear tests before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was
finalized.56 A similar Indian pro-bomb lobby had advocated that
India test atomic weapons before the finalization of the NPT in
1968 in order to classify itself as one of the "haves" in the
treaty and thereby become exempt from the nuclear weapons ban on
the "have-nots." The fear at present is that once the CTBT, which
India has always advocated and supported, is "opened for
signature,"57 India would be forever prevented from testing
nuclear weapons. Creation of a nuclear device without test
detonations is considered technologically difficult for India; to
accede to the CTBT before such extensive tests would, in effect,
take away India's nuclear option. These considerations have led
to Indian demands in early 1996 that the CTBT be accompanied by a
firm timetable for the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the
existing nuclear "haves" as a quid pro quo for Indian abstinence
from weapons testing.
India and Pakistan have been developing their ballistic
missile capabilities as well. India, which performed a nuclear
test in 1974 and has material for 20 to 50 bombs, has developed
surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and IRBM missile systems. The
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SSM Prithvi-150 has a range of 90 miles, while the improved
Prithvi-250 can travel 150 miles. The IRBM Agni has a range of
1,500 miles. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear device, but
analysts suggest that it has material for 6 to 15 bombs. Its two
missile systems, both SSMs, include the indigenous Haft-1 (range
48 miles) and Haft-2 (range 180 miles), and the M-11 (range 180
miles) purchased from China.58
Clearly, India does not have unrestricted access to foreign
nuclear weapons and missile technology given the restraints
imposed by the NPT and the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR). However, the expected technological sophistication of
indigenous nuclear weapons and missiles need not match the
quality of those found in the United States, Great Britain or
France. The minimum expected requirement at present of such
weapons is that bombs must detonate when launched, and missiles
must reach their designated targets. Technological parity with
existing nuclear weapons states, including China, is not
considered important, although this attitude may change if India
decides to embark on an overt nuclear and missile arms buildup to
rival that of the "medium" nuclear powers. However, India must be
reasonably assured that its missiles meet predefined and
projected range, payload, accuracy, and other operational
requirements. In the case of the Army's short-range tactical
missiles, Indian military expectations are that such missiles
must match the technological level available to India's
adversaries. Medium and intermediate range missiles intended for
strategic deterrence need meet less stringent requirements since
they serve a somewhat more flexible and ambiguous purpose.
Whether or not the civilian nuclear energy program is
economically viable, and whether or not the program is intended
primarily to maintain India's nuclear weapons option, the program
has acquired considerable resources and "technological selfsufficiency." India has about 50,000 tonnes of uranium deposits
(found mainly in Bihar and substantial resources of thorium in
Kerala); it is also almost self-sufficient in the basic raw
materials needed to conduct the nuclear program. India also has:
developed and constructed a self-sufficient nuclear
fuel cycle, with uranium mines and mills, a uranium
purification UO2 plant, fuel fabrication plants,
plutonium reprocessing plants, nuclear power reactors
and research reactors. In addition, it has a small
uranium conversion UF6 plant, a pilot uraniumenrichment plant, and heavy-water production plants . .
. India is experimenting with gas centrifuges for the
enrichment of uranium.59
The civilian nuclear program has run into severe
technological snags and breakdowns. India's projected goal of
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attaining 10,000 megawatts of electricity by the year 2000 is
likely to produce in reality only 5,770. However, India's ability
to siphon off a nuclear weapons program from its energy program
is not in doubt. The gestation period of converting civilian
programs to weapons programs at one time almost reached 2 years-the period needed to test the first atomic device at Pokharan in
Rajasthan in May 1974. Today, however, the period may be as short
as 4-6 weeks. By the end of 1995, India's stock of weapons-grade
plutonium was estimated at nearly 420 kilograms, enough for about
85 nuclear weapons.60 Much of this plutonium came from the Dhruva
Research Reactor, which is not under international safeguards.
Further progress on India's Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) program61
will provide India with more plutonium for bombs.
Meanwhile, India's civilian space rocket and satellite
development programs indirectly support the military Agni and
Prithvi missile programs.62 The MTCR does not carry the same legal
constraints as the NPT, which is a multilateral and nearuniversal treaty. The MTCR is an American-initiated, informal
agreement among the G-7 industrialized countries (the United
States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan)
not to transfer missile and rocket technology to those countries
aspiring to develop missiles. The MTCR does not prohibit an overt
program to acquire missile technology; signatories agree merely
to take all measures to prevent the transfer of such technology.
Similarly, New Delhi has also embarked on the indigenous
development of nuclear powered submarines, which India agrees
falls within a grey area not covered by the NPT. The development
of the submarine program at Mazagon Docks in Bombay (in
collaboration with HDW of Germany) ran into political problems
involving alleged kickbacks and had to be cancelled. However, the
development of the reactor and its containment vessel has been
progressing at a satisfactory pace. Indeed, the former Chairman
of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, M.R. Srinivasan, pointed
out that the "work on the reactor was in fact proceeding faster
than the work on the boat itself."63
Concluding Remarks.
These security issues discussed impinge upon each other.
Internal security problems complicate the conduct of external
conventional wars and raise the question of whether conventional
armed forces should be used to crush domestic insurgencies.
Concepts of nuclear deterrence, conventional war escalation
control, and threatened nuclear utilization to terminate
conventional war overshadow conventional military strategies. On
the other hand, democratization and marketization tend to mellow
these security concerns. Wars appear increasingly less
worthwhile. Another conventional war would likely be a stalemate,
while a nuclear war would be catastrophic and unacceptable.
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In conclusion, we may ask whether political pressures
arising from security problems affect democratic processes in
South Asia, and whether marketization and privatization trends
reduce security pressures.64 The experience in South Asia (and
elsewhere in the developing and developed world) has been that
internal security pressures tend to corrupt democratic practices
through the introduction of draconian laws restricting
individuals' rights. Such pressures increase the levels of human
rights violations, and they politicize the armed forces when they
are used to deal with domestic violence. However, the emphasis on
economic reforms and development issues in South Asia tend to
counter these trends to produce a greater level of strategic
stability in the region. India's security environment towards the
year 2000 looks relatively stable and manageable compared to the
turbulence and uncertainty that existed in the decade between the
1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.
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